Washington v. Stickman by unknown
2009 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-23-2009 
Washington v. Stickman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009 
Recommended Citation 
"Washington v. Stickman" (2009). 2009 Decisions. 1496. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1496 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2009 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 06-2044
___________
CHRIS WASHINGTON,
Appellant
   v.
Supt. MR. STICKMAN, SCI-Greene; Deputy Supt. MR. STOWITZKY;
MAJOR CASNER; CAPTAIN COLEMAN; Security Lieutenant MR. BURNS;
MR. MATTHEWS, Hearing Examiner; Jearing Examiner MR. ANSELL;
DOE #1; Activites Manager MR. BRUNO
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 03-cv-00178)
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 22, 2009
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 23, 2009)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Chris Washington appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion to reopen
his case and for leave to file an amended or supplemental complaint.  Washington filed a
2civil rights complaint against appellees in January 2003.  He alleged, inter alia, that
appellees had failed to protect him from an assault by another inmate.  As relief, he
requested damages as well as an injunction requiring the appellees to arrange for him to
be evaluated for reconstructive surgery to repair the injuries to his face.  The District
Court denied appellees’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment with respect to the
claim that appellees had failed to protect Washington from assault.  
Before trial, the parties entered into a settlement agreement.  The settlement
agreement provided for Washington to receive $7500 in return for his settlement of the
claim that appellees failed to protect him from the attack; this claim was referred to as the
“primary action.”  The settlement agreement also noted that Washington claimed that he
had not received adequate medical treatment for his injuries; this claim was referred to as
the “equity action.”  The agreement provided that in order to settle the equity action,
Washington would be seen by an ear, nose and throat specialist, Dr. Brodkin, for a second
opinion on whether he needed further surgery.  Appellees agreed to follow Dr. Brodkin’s
recommendations for further medical treatment.  The parties agreed that Washington
could reopen the equity action if he disagreed with the recommendation of Dr. Brodkin. 
The District Court administratively closed the case but retained jurisdiction to enforce the
terms of the agreement.
Washington was seen by Dr. Brodkin, disagreed with her recommendation, and
filed a motion to reopen the case.  He also requested leave to file an amended
3supplemental complaint.  The District Court reviewed the medical reports from the
specialists and found that additional surgery was not medically necessary.  The District
Court concluded that appellees were not required under the settlement to provide
Washington with additional surgery.  The District Court denied Washington’s motions to
reopen and to file an amended supplemental complaint, and Washington filed a timely
notice of appeal.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s interpretation of the settlement agreement.  Flemming v. Air
Sunshine, Inc., 311 F.3d 282, 289 (3d Cir. 2002).  The settlement agreement clearly
provides that “[i]f after such further consultation, Washington disagrees with Dr.
Brodkin’s diagnosis and decision or recommendation, then Washington may re-open the
Equity Action only in Case No. 03-cv-0178.”  Washington disagreed with Dr. Brodkin’s
diagnosis, and we conclude that he is entitled to reopen the equity action pursuant to the
terms of the settlement agreement.
Appellees argue that reopening would be futile because the claims are frivolous
and the District Court would be required to dismiss them pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).  However, the issue on appeal is whether the terms of the settlement
agreement allow Washington to reopen the action if he disagrees with Dr. Brodkin’s
recommendations.  Moreover, we note that the reopening provision would be rendered
meaningless if reopening was denied based on the futility of an Eighth Amendment claim
     Washington asserts that he refused a settlement with a higher monetary payment that1
did not include the reopening provision.
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for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.  Under appellees’ reasoning,
reopening is futile because surgery was not recommended, but Washington would
presumably only move to reopen if surgery was not recommended.1
It is not clear to us what the parties intended in the event the equity action was
reopened.  Washington’s requests for evaluation and reconstructive surgery were requests
for relief and were not brought or developed as separate legal claims.  Rather, they appear
to have been tied to his primary claims that appellees were deliberately indifferent to his
safety.  Clearly, the District Court did not believe those claims were frivolous as it denied
appellees’ motion for summary judgment.  It is not clear from the record whether the
parties intended to reopen the matter and try the claims of failure to protect with the
remedy being limited to the equitable relief or how they planned to proceed after
reopening.  We will leave it to the District Court to address, in the first instance, how to
proceed upon reopening.  We note that Washington argues in the alternative that the
settlement agreement should be invalidated.  We also leave this question for the District
Court to determine in the first instance.
The District Court denied Washington’s motion for leave to file an amended or
supplemental complaint on the ground that the case was closed.  Now that we have
determined that Washington is entitled to have the case reopened, the District Court
     We note that Washington has contended that he is not being provided with the nasal2
spray recommended by the doctors. Dr. Brodkin recommended that Washington use
Nasonex or Flonase nasal spray daily along with saline spray.  Dr. Kirschner also believed
that Washington’s condition could be improved with an intranasal steroid.  In response to
a prison grievance Washington filed, a health care administrator opined that Washington
did not need the nasal spray because he had no signs of infection.  However, the
settlement agreement provides that the Department of Corrections will follow the
recommendations of Dr. Brodkin, and she recommended that Washington use a nasal
spray daily.
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should revisit its decision as to whether Washington should be allowed to amend or
supplement his complaint.   2
For the reasons above, we will reverse the District Court’s order denying
Washington’s motion to reopen the case and vacate the order denying his motion to file
an amended or supplemental complaint.  We will remand the matter to the District Court
for further proceedings.
